Abstract. The rapid development of the Internet finance has brought great impact and challenge to traditional financial institutions; especially the commercial banks, the competitive game between Internet finance and commercial Banks are inevitable. But how the Internet finance influence commercial banks, which is more positive influence or negative influence, it is the bank's competitive overturn or mutual symbiosis, a clear answer still did not be given from the aspects of quantitative analysis, the relationship are studied between the two from the empirical perspective, especially the impact Internet finance on bank operating efficiency is a blank. This paper is based on the premise of limited rationality of the Internet finance and commercial Banks, by establishing the game payment matrix, analyzing the game problems of Internet finance and commercial Banks, and how the two constantly adjust their own strategy to deal with opposite selective strategy in the process of game in order to achieve the maximization of their own earnings.
Introduction and Literature Summary
Internet finance constantly carry out the traditional business of commercial Banks with much innovativeness, commercial Banks also constantly carry out business innovation to deal with the Internet finance, the commercial banks is faced with the great impact brought about by the Internet finance, which will inevitably take action, a fierce game between Internet financie and commercial Banks are inexorable.
The domestic and foreign research scholars have paid close attention to relationship between Internet finance and traditional commercial banks and have carried out much analysis. On the whole, these research have focused on model definition of Internet finance, impact Internet finance on the traditional banking, and qualitative analysis of banking countermeasures, such as Wan Jianhua (2012), Li Bo, Dong Liang, they expounded and analyzed specific mode of Internet finance, and put forward relevant policy suggestions; Gong Xiaolin(2013) empirically analyze the influence of third-party payment on macro-economy. These research from the perspective of qualitative analysis research studied the relationship between Internet finance and commercial banks, it is generally believed that the Internet finance drive China's financial efficiency, trade structure, even the whole financial architecture is undergoing profound changes, the traditional financial institutions need to use introspection and development vision to deal with the rapid market change in order to achieve steady and rapid development in the competition coexistence of Internet age.
Establishment of Game Model
Basic assumptions of model: (1) The Internet finance and commercial banks are limited rational; they can keep learning and imitating the other's strategy; (2) When the Internet finance and commercial banks do not cooperate with each other, they can choose to cooperate with the third party; (3) Whether the Internet finance or commercial banks, when choosing cooperation with third party, its benefits are greater than their own action. The game payment matrix of Internet finance and commercial banks as shown in Table 1 : Table 1 Game payment matrix Assuming that the probability of Internet finance in cooperation with commercial banks is p , the probability of taking competition is p  1 ; similarly, the probability of commercial bank in cooperation with Internet finance is q , the probability of taking competition is q  1 ; p and q meet and comply standard normal distribution, which is    
The Analysis of Game Model
The final game results of Internet finance and commercial banks, which is mutual cooperation or competition, depends on the size of their expected earnings, when choosing the expected earnings of "cooperation" is greater than expected returns of "competition", it will choose the "cooperation" strategy, and vice versa.
The choice strategy analysis of Internet finance According to the game payment matrix, expected earnings of the Internet finance can be calculated, when the Internet finance take "cooperation" strategy, the expected return is      , the expected earnings of Internet finance choosing cooperation is greater than expected earnings of choosing competition, at this time, "cooperation" strategy is the optimal strategy of the Internet finance, Internet finance will choose cooperation with commercial banks.
In the same way, if the cost of the Internet finance in cooperation with a third party meet the conditions, when
, the expected earnings of Internet finance choosing "competition" strategy is greater than the expected earnings when choosing "cooperation", the "competition" strategy is the Internet financial dominant strategy, Internet finance will choose to compete with commercial banks.
In fact, the Internet finance and commercial banks is not just a simple "competition" and "cooperation" problem, the "competition" and "cooperation" strategy needs to be considered at the same time, namely mixed strategy, the expected earnings of Internet finance under mixed strategy is as follows:
  
Conclusion
Under the condition that Internet finance and commercial banks both have limited rationality, Internet finance will cooperate with commercial banks in most cases, only when the probability of commercial banks choosing cooperation with Internet financial is less than a certain value, the Internet finance will "feel" the probability of cooperation with commercial banks is too small, lack of cooperation sincerity, the Internet finance won't cooperate with commercial banks. This request in real life, if the commercial banks want to cooperate with Internet finance, it is necessary to show the sincerity, or make Internet finance feels cooperation with commercial banks at least is a big probability event; otherwise, the Internet finance will take the competition strategy.
